Southeast Asian Economies and a New Regionalism by Oziewicz, Ewa
Krakowskie
Studia
Międzynarodowe
Ewa O ziewicz
SOUTHEAST A SIA N  ECONOMIES 
A N D  A NEW REGIONALISM
The last years of the 20,h century, especially the failure of the Seattle Ministerial 
Conference in 1999, which was to be the beginning of a new negotiations round of 
WTO and a halt of multilateral negotiations within the new Doha Round (launched in 
2001) after the Cancun Ministerial Conference collapse in 2003, although revived in 
July 2004 after putting in place a new negotiations framework, have become the 
major factor of tuming towards a new regionalism and especially free trade areas all 
around the world as well as in Southeast Asia1.
Pessimistic opinions about the WTO futurę and the fact that it is unable to 
assure a diffused reciprocity in trade without delays, have become one of those points 
which have pushed ASEAN and its members towards a new, open regionalism, 
providing a strong institutional impetus for the proliferation o f bilateral free trade 
areas (FTAs).
Asia, and especially Southeast Asia, is a region where the shift towards 
a new regionalism is extremely visible. Apart of the above-mentioned impulses 
towards a new pattem of integration there are many others as regards the economies 
of ASEAN. Other causes which have driven the ASEAN economies towards to seek 
new forms of integration, such as, among others, FTAs are connected with the 
necessity to take measures against the risks of globalization stemming from the 
disappointment of the Asian financial crisis time. The disappointment, connected 
with the unfulfilled expectation that ASEAN itself, or APEC, would undertake some
1 Whither Free Trade Agreements? Proliferation, Evalualion and Multilateralizalion, edited by J. O ka- 
m oto, IDE DeveIopment Perspective Series no. 2, Tokyo: Institute o f  Developing Economies (IDE), Japan 
Extemal Trade Organization (JETRO), 2003.
effective measures, undermined the credibility of both the institutions. Both of them 
had been seen before the crisis as the key to the economic cooperation and 
sustainable development in the region.
The financial crisis has also shown that the ASEAN countries cannot count 
on the West, and more specifically, neither on the US nor on Japan. Fred Bergsten 
has presented an opinion which is expresses Asian feelings about the subject.
„The single greatest catalyst for the new East Asian regionalism, and the 
reason it is moving most rapidly on the monetary side, is the financial crisis of 1997- 
1998. Most East Asians feel that they were both let down and put upon by the West. 
In their view, western banks and other lenders created much of the crisis by pulling 
out. The leading financial powers then either decided to take part in the rescue 
operations, as the United States did in Thailand, or built the much-bally-hooed 
‘second lines o f defense’ so deviously that they could never be used. At the same 
time, the IMF and the United States dictated much of the Asian response to the 
crisis”2.
Now the Asian economies are looking for new strategies which would allow 
them to navigate in the deep waters of globalization and cope with the challenges that 
this process puts in front of the Asian nations. Many Asian govemments perceive the 
new Asian regionalism as their salvation3. They are of the opinion that they should 
diminish their dependence on the Western countries and multilateral financial 
institutions, such as the IMF or the World Bank. In 1997 an idea of the Asian 
Monetary Fund was bom during the Vancouver APEC Leaders Meeting. ASEAN’s 
enthusiastic attitude towards this idea and several other initiatives showed that the 
member countries were seeking solutions which would be more regionally-based. 
Regional institutions which are concentrated more on the problems of the region 
could better serve individual countries’ needs. As one of the Southeast Asian experts 
states:
“Asian countries claim that a regionally focused facility may be able to 
design more appropriate conditionality than the IMF because of the former’s superior 
regional expertise and its closer geographical proximity to member countries”4.
One of the initiatives is the Chiang Mai Initiative -  a idea presented by the 
ex-Prime Minister of Malaysia Mahathir Mohamad which postulated the creation of 
a totally regional grouping: the East Asian Economic Group (EAEG) comprising 
ASEAN, China, Japan and South Korea. Although so far it has not been 
implemented, the idea has survived as the ASEAN+3 concept. ASEAN + 3’s intent 
to establish an “East Asian Community”, to be announced at a summit meeting in 
Malaysia in December 20055.
Singapore has been the prime country in ASEAN to sign bilateral FTAs, and 
has provided significant demonstration effects for other members to treat the
2 C. F. B e rg s te n ,  East Asian Regionalism , „The Economist” , July 15, 2000, p. 24.
3 S. D. S h a rm a , Beyond ASEAN and APEC: Towards a New Asia-Pacific Economic Regionalism, „East 
Asian Review”, Vol. 14, No. 3, Autumn 2002, pp. 37-48.
4 Ibidem, p. 41.
5 China and the New Economic Geography o f  Asia, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research China in Asia Seminar Series, July 21, 2005.
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entrance into cross-regional and even inter-continental FTAs as a new road to 
liberalization. There are several FTAs in the region, mostly bilateral between 
individual ASEAN members and partners outside the grouping. Parallelly, there are 
plurilateral FTA initiatives with the whole ASEAN and other countries such as 
China, Australia, Japan, India, New Zealand. Generally speaking, there have been 
about 40 different FTAs negotiated or under negotiations in the region sińce 1999. 
Apart from this, the above-mentioned talks about East Asian Economic Community 
or even Asian Economic Community embracing also South Asian countries with 
India among others have been carried out.
An FTA with China -  the ASEAN-China FTA (ACFTA) seems to be the 
most important one. China is among the top trade partners of ASEAN (see table 1). 
The economic and trade cooperation between ASEAN and China has grown 
tremendously lately. The growth of the ASEAN exports to and imports from China 
(without Hong Kong) reached US$ 47.3 billion and US$ 30.9 billion in 2003, 
respectively. Exports to and imports from China experienced an increase of 51.7% 
and 31.2% in 2003, respectively, as compared to the previous year. The trade value 
in 2004 was expected to increase further as indicated by the figures for the first seven 
months of 2004, where the ASEAN exports to and imports from China reached 
US$34.5 billion and US$ 22.2 billion, respectively. This represents an increase of 
40.7% and 34.1%, respectively, for the same period of 2003. ASEAN is also a very 
important partner for China, now it is China’s fifth export market and fourth import 
source. At the ASEAN-China Summit in 2003, a target of US$100 billion in a two- 
way annual trade by 2005 was envisaged and this target is expected to be achieved 
due to the significant growth in trade. In 2005 China will overtake the United States 
as ASEAN’s largest trading partner.
Table 1. ASEAN trade tumovers with the most important partners in 2003 (in 
billions of USD)
Country/Region ASEAN Exports ASEAN Imports
European Union „15” 56,9 42,7
USA 61,3 49,8
Japan 50,3 58,0
South Korea 17,6 15,0
China with Hong Kong 55,9 36,2
IntraASEAN trade 99,7 74,8
Total* 430,3 359,3
*With the exclusion of the Lao PDR and Viet Nam -  data unavailable Source: ASEAN Statistical 
Yearbook 2004, pp. 70-73.
The tariff liberalization will be undertaken under a Normal Track and 
a Sensitive Track. Products covered in the Normal Track schedule will be subjected 
to the tariff reduction and elimination in four tranches, as shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Tariff liberalization within ACFTA
x =  Current applied MFN Tariff Ratc ACFTA Tariff Ratcs (% )
2005 2007 2009 2010
X > 20% 20 12 5 0
15% < X < 20% 15 8 5 0
10% < X < 15% 10 8 5 0
5% < X < 10% 5 5 0 0
X < 5% Standstill 0 0
Source: ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, 2 July 
2005, www.miti.gov.my, 10.10 2005.
Some flexibility in the implementation of the Normal Track will be accorded 
to a limited number of products. Duties on such products will be eliminated only in 
2012. Sensitive products will have tariffs imposed on them even up to 2018.
In spite o f these developments, the conflict in the Taiwan Strait is of greater 
concem to ASEAN, because it bound to lose more if the dynamics in the Strait 
deteriorate dramatically. Although the ASEAN govemments adhere to the “One 
China” policy, Taiwan is a major investor in the most labor-intensive sectors in 
Southeast Asia.
Apart from these initiatives, ASEAN itself has been fulfilling its aims of 
creating an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). Even the Asian financial crisis did not 
stop the grouping from deepening its economic integration. In spite of the crisis, the 
member countries decided to accelerate the process of creating the AFTA and 
shorten the period of introducing mutual reduced tariffs and trade barriers. The 
ASEAN members have also decided to estabhsh the ASEAN Economic Community 
by 2020. This fact evidently shows that the member countries clearly see the profits 
of a closer integration and the reserve they showed in the first period of ASEAN 
existence has melted, although the intra-regional trade barriers appear not so easy to 
be abolished, especially with the less advanced economies in the region.
Anyway, according to the ASEAN Secretariat materials, the AFTA has now 
been virtually established, but it is far less discriminatory than the theory of 
integration has always taught us. The ASEAN member countries have made a signi- 
ficant progress in the lowering of the intra-regional tariffs through the Common 
Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme for the AFTA. More than 99 percent of 
the products in the CEPT Inclusion List (IL) of ASEAN-6, comprising Brunei 
Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, have 
been brought down to the 0-5 percent tariff rangę (see Figurę 1). Although the 
ASEAN members have undertaken several different initiatives, ASEAN’s two most 
recent crises in the region -  the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the war against 
terrorism -  have been managed along bilateral lines.
SO U T H E A ST  A SIA N  EC O N O M IE S 
Table 3. Implementation of CEPT by ASEAN Members, 2003*
Country IL TEL GEL SL Total lines
Number
oflines
Share
(%)
Number 
od lines
Share
(%)
Number 
od lines
Share
(%)
Number
oflines
Share
(%)
Brunei 6,337 97,61 - - 155 2,39 - 6,492
Indonesia 7,206 98,92 - - 68 0,93 U 0,15 7,285
Malaysia 10,116 97,32 218 2,10 53 0,51 8 0,08 1 -,395
Philippines 5,632 99,54 - - 16 0,28 10 0,18 5,658
Singapore 10,716 100,00 - - - - - - 10,716
Thailand 9,211 100,00 - - - - - - 9,211
Cambodia 3,115 45,66 3,523 51,64 134 1,96 50 0,73 6,822
Laos 2,962 83,41 437 12,31 74 2,08 78 2,20 3,551
Myanmar 4,779 87,34 628 11,48 48 0,88 17 0,31 5,472
Vietnam 10,143 97,07 41 - 416 2,14 89 0,79 10,689
ASEAN-10 70,217 92,07 4,847 6,67 964 0,95 263 0,31 76,291
Source: V ietnam ’s M inistry o f  Finance (cited from CIEM 2004).
T h e  CEPT uses four lists -  the Inclusion List (IL); the Tem porary Exclusion List (TEL); the Sensitive 
List (SL) and the General Exception List (GEL) -  for determining the pace and the scope o f  the 
liberalization.
The expansion of ASEAN has introduced a two-tier-, and possibly 
a three-tier-economic system into ASEAN. Rather than a group o f nations 
moving together towards economic development, the association has become 
a dichotomy o f old and new members -  the richer and the poorer -  those moving 
more ąuickly and the others moving more slowly up the ladder o f development. 
The relatively loose arrangement within ASEAN has enabled it to deal with 
China and Japan with a greater confidence than it would have on a bilateral basis.
Speaking about the FTAs in the region, we can broadly divide the 
motives of entering such agreements into strategie or political ones on the one 
hand, and economic ones on the other, although a sharp division o f the reasons 
seems to be rather blurred. Economic motives very often mix to some extent with 
the political ones.
Thailand has made a significant progress to advance the framework 
agreements with a number of countries, including such significant powers as 
China, India, Japan, and the United States. The implications o f FTAs appear to be 
tremendous for Thailand in terms o f an economic success, such as trade inerease, 
GDP and welfare improvement, structural changes related to specific FTAs and 
sectorial impact6.
6 S. C h ir a th iv a t , S. M a llik a m a s , Thailand's FTA Strategy, „ASEAN Economic Bulletin”, Apri! 
2004, Vol. 21, Issue 1, p. 37-53.
Figurę 1. Pereentage of Tariff Lines at 0-5 percent in the Tentative 2004 CEPT 
Package
Source: Trade, wvvw.aseansec.org, 10.10.2005.
The main motive for Thailand to enter such agreements is the fact that it has 
resorted to bilateralism as it has been frustrated with the progress in trade 
liberalization at the regional and multilateral levels. It may easily be noticed that 
while the FTA proposals have been under consideration sińce the year 2000, the idea 
of FTAs has been much more aggressively pursued ever sińce the Thaksin 
govemment took office in 2001.
Malaysia’s outlook on the FTAs has been different from that of Thailand. 
This is the conseąuence of the changes in the country’s production structure and 
trade composition. Firstly, Malaysia has not viewed the FTAs as positive for its 
economy. Secondly, there are very important linkages between Malaysia’s FTA 
policy and the ASEAN diplomacy. Thirdly, due to these complex linkages, Malaysia 
would rather support the ASEAN-wide FTA initiatives than the bilateral ones. In any 
case, Malaysia has started negotiations on a FTA with Japan, India, Pakistan, Australia 
and New Zealand. The objectives in negotiating the FTAs by Malaysia are to:
• seek a better market access for goods and services;
• further facilitate and promote trade, investment and economic development;
• enhance the competitiveness of Malaysian exporters and build capacity in speci- 
fically targeted areas through technical cooperation and collaboration7.
Malaysia is also engaged in the trade and investment cooperation under the 
Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) with the United States. TIFA has 
provisions for a possible FTA between Malaysia and the US.
The participation of individual countries in regional FTAs, such as the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement 
(ACFTA), helps the developing countries of the region to succeed in the domestic 
economic reforms. The trade liberalization through the participation in such FTAs is 
a very useful lesson and an experience for such countries as for instance Vietnam. This 
way of liberalization lowers the adjustment costs for the efforts in industria-lization and 
introduction of structural reforms8. It also has an extremely positive effect as far as the 
trade increase, and the GDP and welfare improvement are concemed9.
Vietnam signed a Bilateral Trade Agreement with the US (VN-US BTA) in 
2000. It was expected to have a huge positive influence on Vietnam’s economy. Since 
the moment of this agreement coming into force in December 2001 Vietnam’s exports 
to the US have increased more than fourfold over two years, growing from US$1,05 
billion in 2001 to US$ 4,55 billion in 2003. The US became the largest market for 
Vietnamese exports in 2003. Although the estimations for 2004 show that the growth 
rate of Vietnam’s exports to this country was around 10%, the implementation of the 
Agreement has proved that Vietnamese firms are capable to penetrate the US market. It 
is obvious that the lack of experience, know-how and information about this huge 
market are causing problems to Vietnamese firms, but it has transpired that the 
insufficient production capacity and the difficult access to the working capital are the 
main constraints there. The VN-US BTA is regarded to be a very important step 
towards Vietnam’s entering WTO.
Above we have shown some examples of positive effects stemming from the 
new regionalism. There are, however, also some examples which do not confirm the 
rule. Such an example are the Philippines. In the Philippines the significant trade 
liberalization did not translate into a high economic growth.
It is stressed that the ASEAN regionalism is not in conflict with globalism. 
It is to be considered that under the policy of the export oriented industrialization 
based on FDI, the open regionalism seems to be the only possibility for a futurę 
development of those economies.
The superior aim of the new regionalism, which is very ofiten called open 
regionalism, is to reach compatibility between the regional integrative agreements 
and the global trading system embodied by WTO10. Finally, this kind of regiona­
lism can be seen as a factor supporting the process o f globalization and not as its 
counterweight.
7 Free Trade Agreements, Press release, w w w .miti.gov my, 10.10.2005.
*T. M un H eng, G. V a su d ev a n , lmpact o f  Regional Trade Liberalization on Emerging Economies, 
“ASEAN Economic Bulletin”, August 2004, Vol. 21, Issue 2, p. 167-182.
9 S. C h ir a th iy a t, S. M a llik a m a s , Thailand's FTA Strategy, “ASEAN Economic Bulletin”, April 
2004, Vol. 21, Issue 1, p. 37-53.
10 C. F. B e r g ste n , Open Regionalism, Institute for International Economies, http://www.iie.com, 18.10.2005.
